Race and the Education of Desire

FOUCAULT'S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY

AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS

BY ANN LAURA STOLER

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS Durham and London 1995

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Typeset in Joanna by Tseng Information Systems, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data appear
on the last printed page of this book.
Seventh printing, 2006

Racism is a complex, if elusive subtext of it. Before turning to the lectures in chapter 3, I outline how Foucault saw the relationship between racism and discourses of sexuality in *The History of Sexuality* and suggest some of the dissonances that emerge when the economics of colonial racism is joined with his account.

Discourses of Sexuality and Racism in The History of Sexuality

Foucault's engagement with issues of racism is not easy to untangle. While references to racism appear sparingly throughout volume 1, the fact of modern racism is fundamental to its project. Racism is first mentioned in a discussion of the earliest technologies of sex that arose in the eighteenth century around the political economy of population, regulating the modes of sexual conduct by which populations could be expanded and controlled. It was, "these new measures that would become the anchorage points for the different varieties of racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (HS:26). In describing the rupture between a medicine of sex and the biology of reproduction in the nineteenth century, Foucault describes how the scientific arbitrators of sex authorized the "hygienic necessity" of cleansing and invigorating the social body in forms that "justified the racisms of the state, which at the time were on the horizon" (HS:54). Note that here racism is a potential waiting to be born, not yet on the terra firma that produced the rigid racial taxonomies of the late nineteenth century.

In colonial perspective, we could easily offer a different chronology with other prefigurings, of which Foucault was clearly aware. Colonial technologies of rule bear witness to earlier, explicit racially-based policies once in widespread use. Discriminations based on color divided black slaves from indentured poor whites in the American south in the early 1600s just as religion and color served to delineate status in the Dutch East Indies a half century later.[23] By 1680, those of "mixed-blood" were systematically

23. Ernest van den Boogaart, "Colour Prejudice and the Yardstick of Civility: the Initial Dutch Confrontation with Black Africans, 1590–1635," *Racism and Colonialism*, ed. Robert Ross (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). Boogaart's effort to distinguish "color prejudice" of the early seventeenth century from the racism of a later period belies how early both color and religion were the joint criteria on which access to office and residence was based. For the Dutch East Indies see Willem Mastenbroek, *De Historische Ontwikkeling van de Staatsrechtelijke Indeeling der Bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indie* (Wageningen: Veenman, 1934) 35. On the force of racism in eighteenth-century France and its colonies see Pierre Pluchon (*Nègres et Juifs au XVIIIe siècle: Le racisme au siècle des Lumières* [Paris: Tallandier, 1984]).

denied entry to the upper echelons of the Indies bureaucratic service.[24] When Spain is brought back within the "European" picture, the "undisguised contempt" for *criollos* and "half-breeds" that peninsular Spaniards and metropolitan authorities displayed is evident even earlier.[25]

Students of U.S., French, British, and Dutch colonial history have debated whether these were emergent racisms of a different order, not yet as firmly biologized as in the nineteenth century. Some argue that racism was systematically embraced by the seventeenth century, others hold that it had not yet emerged in its consolidated, pure somatic form.[26] In either case, there is good evidence that discourses of race did not have to await mid-nineteenth-century science for their verification. Distinctions of color joined with those of religion and culture to distinguish the rulers from the ruled, invoked in varied measures in the governing strategies of colonial states. In the nineteenth century, on the other hand, race becomes the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the "measure of man" were framed. And with it, "culture" was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule.

24. C. Fasseur, *De Indologen: Ambtenaren voor de Oost, 1825–1950* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1993) 119.

25. See Anthony Pagden's "Identity Formation in Spanish America" (*Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World* Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), where he argues that, "within a few years of the conquest the mestizos, far from being the bearers of a new mixed culture, had become a despised breed, contemptuous of their own Indian origins and rejected by a white elite that had come to fear racial contamination too much to wish to acknowledge direct association with them" (71).

26. This debate has been most sharply defined in the U.S. over the relationship between racism and slavery in the seventeenth century. It has been treated in depth in other contexts and I will not review them here. See Winthrop Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1968); George Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Alden Vaugh, "The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in 17th Century Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 97 (July 1989): 347–49; and David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness* (London: Verso, 1991) esp. 23–36. For a sample of the wide range of contributors to this debate from philosophy, history and comparative literature see Harold Pagliaro, ed., *Racism in the Eighteenth Century* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve UP, 1973).

But even among historians who place the emergence of modern racism in the nineteenth century, this emergence is often dated earlier than does Foucault, around 1800—coterminous with an anxious and uncertain bourgeois order—not subsequent to it.[27] Why, then, does Foucault embrace this particular version of the nineteenth-century history of race but categorically reject the standard story of nineteenth-century sexuality? *The History of Sexuality* hints at some reasons, but the lectures offer more guidance. Colonialism was clearly outside Foucault's analytic concern, to him a byproduct of Europe's internal and permanent state of war with itself, not formative of those conflicts. In lectures, he would state only that racism was elaborated with colonization, to allow and account for "la genocide colonisateur." Colonial genocide is then one manifestation of a much more protracted discourse on the war of races, an elaborative moment of it.

Foucault's focus on the second half of the nineteenth century has other motivations as well. His concern was with state racism, not its popular forms. Racism is a state affair, confirmed by a set of scientific discourses that bear witness to it (HS:147). This latter may seem like a curious formulation, given the common rendering of Foucault's position that the state is not a privileged site for the discursive construction of power. But reading the lectures against *The History of Sexuality* provides a more subtle insight. The state is not written off as a locus of power. Rather, Foucault locates how state institutions foster and draw on new independent disciplines of knowledge and in turn harness these micro-fields of power as they permeate the body politic at large.

Another issue informs his chronology, a point we can only vaguely discern from *The History of Sexuality*: the principal form of state racism which concerned Foucault was that of the Nazi state and its "Final Solution." As such, there is an implicit teleology to how he treats what racist discourse "does." It must account for a set of practices that allow a state to identify not primarily its external foes, but its enemies within. In both the lectures and volume one, the focus is on the internal dynamics of European states

27. See George Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1978); Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (London: Tavistock, 1977); Collette Guillaumin, "Idea of Race"; Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, 23. Tom Holt places racism as a "creature of the ostensibly nonracist ideology that had undermined and destroyed slavery." Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992) xx.

and their disciplinary biopolitical strategies. Contiguous empires figure in Foucault's genealogy of racism in his lectures, but imperial expansion outside Europe does not. In short, the genealogy of racist discourse is sui generis to Europe: colonial genocide is subsumed, dependent, accounted for, and explained *in absentia*.

For Foucault, racism is embedded in early discourses on sexuality, but not yet in explicit form. In the making of a bourgeois "class" body in the eighteenth century, a new field of discourse emerged concerned with "body hygiene, the art of longevity, ways of having healthy children and of keeping them alive as long as possible" that "attest to the correlation of this concern with the body and sex to a type of 'racism'" (HS:125). But "racism" is still bracketed here with inverted commas. This was not, he warns us, the familiar racism of the blue-blood aristocracy, invested in a conservative status quo. On the contrary it was a "dynamic racism, a racism of expansion, even if it was still in a budding state, awaiting the second half of the nineteenth century to bear the fruits that we have tasted" (HS:125). Two important issues emerge here. First, this is the only place in *The History of Sexuality* where Foucault alludes both to different historical moments of racism and to its different varieties. Up to this point, racism has been presented as a nineteenth-century invention. Here, however, he specifies an earlier racism that preceded its bourgeois form, one "manifested by the nobility" and organized for different ends. But note again, racism remains both internal to northern Europe and of elite derivation.[28]

This is not a unique story of racism's origin.[29] Benedict Anderson offers an account that, at first glance, would seem very much the same. In *Imagined Communities*, he writes:

28. Foucault's only mention of "inquisitions" is in the context of the spread of the confessional in the Middle Ages (HS:58). The sort of "state racism" that one might argue was entailed in the Spanish Inquisition and the policies of mass expulsion and extermination based on "purity of blood" is perhaps assumed, but unaddressed. On the Inquisition's part in accenting issues of race and a discourse on the "purity of blood" see Henry Kamen, *Inquisition and Society in Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1985) esp. 101–133. For support of the argument that the early Spanish history of racism was salient to the making of national identities in nineteenth-century northern Europe, see Michael Ragussis, "The Birth of a Nation in Victorian Culture: The Spanish Inquisition, the Converted Daughter, and the 'Secret Race'" *Critical Inquiry* 20 (Spring 1994): 477–508.

29. Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Class* (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1951) for example, argued that imperialist policy was not at odds with the interests of the aristocracy, but "rested on it" (35).

> dreams of racism have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation; above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding' among aristocracies. No surprise . . . that on the whole, racism and anti-semitism manifest themselves, not across national boundaries, but within them. In other words, they justify not so much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination.[30]

While Anderson and Foucault concur on racism's aristocratic etymology, they differ on two fundamental counts. For Anderson, racism derives from class. For Foucault, as we shall see in chapter 3, it is the other way around: a discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races. Also, for Foucault, these racisms of the nobility and the bourgeoisie are distinct, discontinuous, and qualitatively different in kind. For Anderson, on the contrary, racism is not only continuous but serves the hybrid "upper class" political project of "official nationalism." These two racisms become one and the same, welded by a nineteenth-century "conception of empire" in which "colonial racism was a major element."[31] By his account "late colonial empires even served to shore up domestic aristocratic bastions, since they appeared to confirm on a global, modern stage antique conceptions of power and privilege."[32] In short, colonial racism was of "aristocratic or pseudo-aristocratic derivation," but not confined to those class interests. Colonial empires "permitted sizeable numbers of bourgeois and petty bourgeois to play aristocrat off center court: i.e. anywhere in the empire except at home"[33] (my emphasis). We will have occasion to question Anderson's portrayal of European colonial communities as comprised of a "bourgeois aristocracy" in chapter 4. Here, I invoke him to underscore the basic point that notions of "a purity of blood" and the racisms that they expressed circulated through empire and back through Europe. They were never contained in Europe alone.

While Foucault's description of this "familiar" earlier aristocratic racism is at best vague, his account of its later "dynamic" variant has more specific referents. It is in the late nineteenth century that technologies of sex

30. Anderson, Imagined Communities 136.
31. Anderson 137.
32. Anderson 137.
33. Anderson 137.

degeneracy

are most fully mobilized around issues of race with the pseudo-scientific theory of degeneration at their core. He writes:

> The series composed of perversion-heredity-degenerescence formed the solid nucleus of the new technologies of sex. . . . Its application was widespread and its implantation went deep. Psychiatry, to be sure, but also jurisprudence, legal medicine, agencies of social control, the surveillance of dangerous or endangered children, all functioned for a long time on the basis of 'degenerescence' and the heredity-perversion system. An entire social practice, which took the exasperated but coherent form of a state-directed racism, furnished this technology of sex with a formidable power and far-reaching consequences. (HS:118-119)

That "vast theoretical and legislative edifice" that was the theory of degeneracy secured the relationship between racism and sexuality. It conferred abnormality on individual bodies, casting certain deviations as both internal dangers to the body politic and as inheritable legacies that threatened the well-being of a race (PK:204).

There is nothing particularly innovative in this formulation. Sander Gilman, Daniel Pick, and Anna Davin, among others, have treated the discourse of degeneracy with more nuance and far more historical depth than Foucault.[34] Pick argues that degeneracy was a "European disorder" that "above all [evoked] danger from internal transgressions rather than inter-racial 'pollution'."[35] Crystallizing in eugenics, nineteenth-century degeneracy theory developed as a national and a class-specific project that converged with wider purity campaigns for improved natality and selective sterilization. While Pick rejects what he calls the more conventional portrayal of degeneracy as part of the racist construction of empire, for Foucault, empire never comes up. Only Nazism is mentioned as, "doubtless the most cunning and the most naive combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of disciplinary power" (HS:149).

34. Sander Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1985) 191–216; Anna Davin, "Motherhood and Imperialism," *History Workshop* 8 (1978); Daniel Pick, *The Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918* (New York: Cambridge, 1989). Cf. Dain Borges, "'Puffy, Ugly, Slothful and Inert': Degeneration in Brazilian Social Thought, 1880–1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25 (1993): 235–256 who looks at the discourse on degeneration as a "major vehicle of social criticism . . . for Brazilian intellectuals" in this period.
35. Pick, *Faces of Degeneration* 39.

Pick differs with Foucault on a crucial point. The discourse of degeneracy was not an instrumental vehicle of bourgeois empowerment as for Foucault, but quite the opposite, an expression of "social anxiety," "internal disorder," and political fear; in short, a representation of "powerlessness" within a "seemingly self-possessed imperious discourse."[36] From a colonial perspective, this makes much more sense. As we will see in chapter 4, notions of degeneracy were directed at multiple targets and had wide applications.[37] They not only targeted colonized populations as Pick assumes, but also the indigent, supposedly *décivilisé*, racially-hybrid members within the European community. Degeneracy characterized those who were seen to veer off bourgeois course in their choice of language, domestic arrangement, and cultural affiliation. Notions of degeneracy registered dissension among Europeans and basic uncertainties about who would be granted that privileged status.[38] Thus, in the Dutch Indies, "degenerate" was an adjective that invariably preceded those labelled as poor and white. It could be invoked to protect the schools of "full-blooded" Dutch children from their poor Indo-European compatriots, as well as from those children who were "purely" Javanese. Similarly, the notion of degeneracy appears repeatedly in the 1898 Indies legal code on mixed-marriages to justify why European women who choose native men as their husbands should not be entitled to Dutch citizenship. The point is this was not a "European" disorder or a specifically colonial one, but a "mobile" discourse of empire that designated eligibility for citizenship, class membership, and gendered assignments to race.

Biopower, Sexuality and Race

While the references cited above suggest a progressive story of racism emerging out of earlier technologies of sex, Foucault's story, not surprisingly, is far more complicated. It is in the book's final chapter where the welding of racism to "biopower" confers on racism its most virulent form. It is not biopower per se that produces racism, but rather the "calculated management of life" consolidated in the nineteenth century bringing together the two "poles" of biopower that emerged separately two centuries earlier (HS:140). One pole centers on the disciplining of the individual, on the "anatomo-politics of the human body"; the second centers on a set of "regulatory controls" over the life of the species in a "biopolitics of the population" (HS:139).[39]

What marks nineteenth-century biopower as unique then is not its focus on the individual body and the species alone, although this is the feature that most commentators have rightly pointed out.[40] It also joins two distinct technologies of power operating at different levels; one addresses the disciplining of individual bodies, the other addresses the "global" regulation of the biological processes of human beings.[41] It is this "technology of power centered on life" that produces a normalizing society and a new form of racism inscribed within it. Foucault would explore these connections in more detail in his 1976 lectures, but this concern with normality is already prefigured in volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*, in *Discipline and Punish*, earlier still in *Madness and Civilization*, and *The Birth of the Clinic*, as well.[42]

36. Pick 237.

37. This was, of course, true in Europe and the U.S. as well, where a discourse of degeneracy was used by feminist and left wing birth control advocates such as Emma Goldman as well as those adamantly against them. See Daniel Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1985) 90 and Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (New York: Grossman, 1976).

38. Pick, *Faces of Degeneration* 39.

39. In *Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (London: Polity Press, 1991), Megan Vaughan explores "the limitations of a Foucauldian account of biopower," arguing that colonial medical discourse and practice differed substantially from that described by Foucault because it conceptualized Africans "first and foremost, as members of groups and it was these groups, rather than individuals who were said to possess distinctive psychologies and bodies. In contrast to the developments described by Foucault, in colonial Africa group classification was a far more important construction than individualization" (11). In this otherwise rich study on colonial power, medicine and African subjectivity, Vaughan misses just this point that nineteenth-century biopower represented a shift toward the regulation of the social body, toward the normalization of collective identities, and away from individualizing disciplinary regimes. Vaughan dismisses Foucault's account precisely because she understands biopower to be a form of individualization rather than collective regulation.

40. See, for example, Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault* 140.

41. Michel Foucault, *Temps Modernes* 45.

42. Colin Gordon makes a similar observation:

> Whether out of a polemical appetite for indications of unstable oscillation and damaging retreat, or through an inclination to apply the (often misunderstood) Foucauldian thematic of discontinuity to Foucault's own thought, or simply out of the need for a striking story-line, the evidences of a strong continuity from *Histoire de la folie* through to the end of Foucault's output have generally been paid too little critical attention."

See Colin Gordon, "*Histoire de la folie*: An Unknown Book of Michel Foucault," *History of the Social Sciences* 3.1 (1990): 5.

In *Discipline and Punish*, he identifies 1840, when the children's rural reformatory was established at Mettray, as the start of a "new era" in the "normalization of power." It was a key moment when what he calls the "carceral archipelago" of the nineteenth century produced a "slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation" that allowed the "social enemy" to be defined at once by irregularities, departures from the norm, anomaly and criminal deviations (DP:298–9). In the French language edition of *Madness and Civilization*, he already has set out "to write a history of boundaries . . . by which a culture rejects something that it will designate for itself as Exterior."[43] In each of these projects, Foucault first explores the "normalization of power." By the time he writes *The History of Sexuality* and the lectures on racism, his focus has shifted to a wider concern with the power of normalization.[44] And with this shift, the underpinnings of his approach to modern racism are close at hand. This creation of the "internal enemy" and of "the dangerous individual," both framed within a "theory of social defense," will be fundamental, as we shall see in the following chapter, to how Foucault will explain the racisms of modern states.[45] As George Mosse, among others, has noted, the distinction between normality and abnormality, between bourgeois respectability and sexual deviance, and between moral degeneracy and eugenic cleansing were the elements of a discourse that made unconventional sex a national threat and thus put a premium on managed sexuality for the health of a state.[46] Foucault writes, "Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis of regulation (HS:146)." Through this new biopolitic "management of life,"

43. *Folie et Déraison: Historie de la Folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Plon, 1961). The French quote reads: "On pourrait faire une histoire des *limites*,—de ces gestes obscurs, nécessairement oubliés dès qu'accomplis, par lesquels une culture rejette quelque chose qui sera pour elle l'Exterieur," III.

44. In agreement with Miller's biography of Foucault, Mark Lilla notes: ". . . it was the idea of social boundaries and their trangression, not homoeroticism as such, that dominated [Foucault's] mature outlook." "A Taste of Pain," *Times Literary Supplement* 26 March 1993: 3. Also see John Rajchman's discussion (*Truth and Eros*, 105–106) of Foucault's reflections on the "technology of exclusion."

45. On this creation of "the dangerous individual" as an enemy of society within a "theory of social defense" see his seldom referenced but fascinating piece, "About the Concept of the 'Dangerous Individual' in 19th century Legal Psychiatry," *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* I (1978): 1–18.

46. George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1985) esp. 10–22.

sex not only stamped individuality; it emerged as "the theme of political operations" and as an "index of a society's strength, revealing of both its political energy and biological vigor" (HS:146).

Thus surveillance of sexuality and insistence on racial supremacy are played out at several levels that, in the wake of feminist history, are now familiar. The sexualization of children "was accomplished in the form of a campaign for the health of the race" (HS:146), while the medicalization of women's bodies was carried out "in the name of the responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the family institution and the safeguarding of society" (HS:147). In Foucault's abridged rendering of these processes in volume 1, the two crucial elements of gender and empire are missing from his account. But it is imperial-wide discourses that linked children's health programs to racial survival, tied increased campaigns for domestic hygiene to colonial expansion, made child-rearing an imperial and class duty, and cast white women as the bearers of a more racist imperial order and the custodians of their desire-driven, immoral men.[47]

If the connections among sexuality, race, and biopower outlined above seem only loosely articulated it is because in Foucault's story they remain so. He links racism and the technologies of sexuality directly to biopower, without linking racism and sexuality explicitly to each other. Their relationship is mediated through what he would later call, "a sort of statisation of the biological," a biopolitical state in which sex was an instrumental "target" and racism an effect. What is implicit, however, is important. If "a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life" (HS:144), then, as we shall see from his lectures, modern racism is the historical outcome of a normalizing society. It is no coincidence that his Collège de France lectures given in 1974–75 were devoted to *les anormaux* (abnormals) and to racism and the biopolitical state the following year. Both dealt with the burden of normality and its biological technologies and with how these "relations of subjugation can produce

47. See Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood" for one of the earliest and still best, accounts of an imperial "biohistory" that does not use the term. Also see Nancy Hunt, "Le bébé en brousse': European Women, African Birth Spacing and Colonial Intervention in Breastfeeding in the Belgian Congo," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21.3 (1988): 401–432; my "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power"; and Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907–1925," *Signs* 16.4 (1991): 787–807.

subjects," defined by their varied transgressions as "internal enemies" of society and state.[48]

Deployments of Alliance, Deployments of Sexuality and Race

Distinctions between the technologies of bodily discipline and mass regulation are not the only distinctions Foucault explores. Two other fundamental oppositions mark the rise of biopower in modern European history. One is the distinction between a deployment or device ("*dispositif*") of alliance and a deployment of sexuality.[49] The other is the distinction between a "symbolics of blood" and an "analytics of sexuality," each initially grounded in distinct regimes of power. How do these contrasting terms relate? What do they have to do with racism, and what kind of colonial sense can we make of them?

In skeletal form, his argument runs something like this. Prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the regulation of social life was mediated through a "deployment of alliance," in which control over sexual practices centered on matrimonial relations (HS:37) and on legal and religious codes of conduct that distinguished between the lawful and illicit sexual practices. This system, centered on "legitimate alliance" (HS:38), was "attuned to a homeostasis of the social body" (HS:107), to the sexual behavior of the conjugal couple, and to "maintain[ing] the laws that govern" those relations (HS:106). Foucault writes, "This deployment of alliance, with the mechanisms of constraint that ensured its existence and the complex knowledge it often required, lost some of its importance as economic processes and political structures could no longer rely on it as an adequate instrument or sufficient support" (HS:106). This failure to maintain elite control within an alliance-based system of power is not fleshed out, nor does Foucault seem to consider that such an explication is required. He only hints at those "economic processes and political structures" in which the decline of absolutism and monarchy and the rise of liberalism

48. Michel Foucault, *Resumé des cours: 1970–1982* (Paris: Julliard, 1984): 85.

49. "Dispositif" is a loaded theoretical concept for Foucault that is notoriously difficult to translate. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow prefer to translate it as "deployment," Gilles Deleuze as "[social] apparatus," Alan Sheridan chooses "machinery." I prefer "deployment," "device," and "apparatus" and use them interchangeably. See Gilles Deleuze's "What is a dispositif?" (in *Michel Foucault: Philospher*, Timothy Armstrong, ed. [New York: Routledge, 1992] 159–168), the most lucid explanation I know of that captures the complexity of meaning and movement in the term.